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Compliant TEE, there still lacks an easy way of using the C binding GP TEE
Client API. In this thesis, the problem is addressed in more details and the pro-
posed solution by designing and prototyping a Java API is discussed.
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TEE Trusted Execution Environment





API Application Program Interface
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
NDK Android Native Development Kit
SoC System on Chip
SGX Software Guard Extensions
ObC On-board Credentials
SMC Secure Monitor Call
ELF Executable and Linkable Format
JNI Java Native Interface
UUID Universally unique identifier
RMR Registered Memory Reference




TPM Trusted Platform Module
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TSS TCG Software Stack
TSP Trusted Service Provider
TCS Trusted Core Service
TDDL Trusted Device Driver Library
TSPI TSP Interface
MAC Mandatory Access Control
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DAC Discretionary Access Control
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For the last decade, the vast majority of mobile devices are shipped with
a hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [6]. A TEE is an
isolated computational environment which provides integrity protection and
secure storage services to the outside untrusted world. It is separated from
the Rich Execution Environment (REE) in which normal operating systems
(OSs) are running. By keeping confidential information and limiting its ma-
nipulations within the TEE, even if the REE is compromised, it is still hard
for critical information breaches from the TEE. A general TEE consists of a
hardware trust anchor, such as the ARM TrustZone [3], and software includ-
ing a Trusted OS. It is possible to attack the software parts. One example
can be found in the exploit CVE-2015-6639 1. However, the capacity of
the TEE is much smaller than the REE and it can only allow limited op-
erations, which makes the TEE more manageable and susceptible to fewer
bugs. Moreover, the TEE normally exposes its service to the outside world
using a component defined in the REE, such as a kernel driver. Client Ap-
plications (CAs) running inside the REE can utilize the functionality of the
TEE via an Application Program Interface (API) exported via this compo-
nent. Nowadays, ordinary developers do not have access to these APIs which
are limited to TEE venders, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and
service providers who want to use the TEE to protect their digital proper-
ties, e.g. Netflix. The lack of standardized API is also a big challenge for
ordinary developers to benefit from the TEE. To remove such an obstacle,
the GlobalPlatform(GP) came to play the role by publishing the GP TEE
Client API specification [7] which standardizes the way how CAs can interact
with a GP-Compliant TEE. A recent promising implementation of GP TEE
related specifications can be found in Open-TEE [22] which is a virtual TEE
1QSEE privilege escalation vulnerability and exploit, https://bits-please.
blogspot.dk/2016/05/qsee-privilege-escalation-vulnerability.html
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that can provide development environments for CAs and Trusted Applica-
tions (TAs). A prototype implementation which includes our solution is also
based on it.
Fact is that the GP TEE Client API comes with a form of C style. Fact
is, too, that the mainstream programming language of Android application
development is Java. This poses a challenge for Android developers who wish
to utilize the functionality of a GP-compliant TEE. Although thanks to the
Android Native Development Kit (NDK) [12], developers can write native
code in their applications using the GP TEE Client API to interact with
a GP-compliant TEE. It is still difficult to deal with complex native code
especially for those who are not familiar with it.
So how can Java developers use the GP-compliant TEEs directly from
Java? The first challenge that we are faced with is how different design prin-
ciples specified in GP TEE Client API, such as the shared memory between
CAs and TAs, should be transformed while still function in an acceptable
manner. Another challenge is how to expose the data types to ordinal Java
developers in a way that the underlying implementations can be hidden from
them and also provide flexibility for different kinds of underlying implementa-
tions. To overcome these two challenges, we have introduced a Java interface
for TEEs. The ultimate goal is to allow Java developers directly
access a GP-compliant TEE. GP TEE Client API enables developers to
access to the GP-compliant TEE using C API. So a Java wrapper for C API
is needed. As a result, we have mapped the GP TEE Client API to a Java
API named with OT-J. Instead of directly replacing the data types defined
in GP TEE Client API to Java types, we have converted all C structs to Java
interfaces and all C API are embedded into corresponding Java interfaces.
Benefiting from the information hiding feature of these Java interfaces, ordi-
nal Java developers need not to worry about the underlying implementations
and it is also possible for alternative implementations of the OT-J.
In this thesis, we target a Java API on Android.
The contributions of this thesis are:
1. Designing a GP TEE Client Java API named as OT-J (its documenta-
tion presented in Appdendix A) and describing the design philosophy
behind it (Chapter 4);
2. A prototype implementation in Android, which fully realize OT-J (Chap-
ter 5);




This chapter describes the background information related to this thesis.
2.1 TEE & REE
As stated in the previous chapter, TEE is an isolated computing environ-
ment which can offer the benefit of platform boot integrity, device identifica-
tion/authentication, integrity protection and secure storage services for the
REE [6]. See the TEE general architecture in Figure 2.1. The conventional
REE represents an operating system (REE OS), such as Windows, Mac OS
X, Linux, Android or iOS. It abstracts the underlying hardware and provides
corresponding resources and functionality for the CAs to run within/top of
it. Normally it has rich features compared to the TEE OS. However, the
REE is vulnerable to different kinds of attacks, such as malware. In order to
protect sensitive private information, such as decryption private keys, against
these attacks, it is good to keep this information safely in a separate con-
tainer in case the REE is compromised. The TEE provides the isolation for
such a secure container. In addition, a small set of applications named TAs
can run within the TEE. The combination of secure storage and constrained
operations on it defined by the TAs can keep the private information securely
inside of the TEE without exposing it to the REE.
The TEE is isolated from the REE by using either a security co-processor
or processor secure environment [8]. Normally the REE is integrated into a
physic chip named System on Chip (SoC). In the first case, the security co-
processor can be a processor either inside or outside of the SoC module. The
TEE OS runs on top of the security co-processor along with the REE OS
running in a normal processor. As such, the TEE and REE are separated
from each other by strict hardware boundaries. For the device only equipped
10
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with one processor, another architecture for the TEE is providing a processor
secure environment on this single processor with the REE. So the TEE and
REE share common resources but only one of them can function at a given
time. This approach only requires one processor which is cheaper to deploy
but lacks of efficiency compared with the first one.
Figure 2.1: TEE general architecture [22]
2.2 ARM TrustZone
ARM TrustZone [2] is one of the outcomes by applying the second approach
as stated in previous section. In TrustZone, the TEE is regarded as the
secure world and the REE as the normal world. To establish a reliable trust
model, the boot procedure of the device starts at the processor loading the
TEE OS and running it in a secure world. Once the TEE OS booted up,
it will signal the processor to switch to normal world and begin booting the
REE OS. After that, the REE OS can make a Secure Monitor Call (SMC) to
allow the TEE OS control the processor again. In this case, the processor has
to switch the context back and forth between the secure and normal world.
Because they share the common resources, when the processor changed to
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normal world, the storage of the TEE is protected using encryptions and only
the TEE can access to it. Due to the fact that only one world can remain
in the processor, this helps to isolate the TEE and REE by disabling their
direct interactions. However, context switches of the processor come with a
big overhead which is the major drawback with this solution.
2.3 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
SGX is a software extension and hardware-based approach provided by Intel
[18, 23], which also adopts the second approach by creating a processor secure
environment to create a TEE. Unlike the context switches between the secure
and normal world in TrustZone, there is no such switch in the SGX. The
processor which runs SGX holds a private key limited to the CPU which is
used to decrypt part of an application called Enclave. The Enclave is the
encrypted code and data which can be decrypted only by the CPU. When
the Enclave data leaves the CPU, it will be encrypted again. By limiting
the usage of the Enclave within the CPU, it can prevent external accesses.
Compared with TrustZone, without the complex context switch, SGX does
not need to restore the previous device state.
2.4 Use cases for TEE
This section states the efforts which adopt the TEE to other solutions.
On-board Credentials (ObC) Credentials are widely used to protect
communications via insecure channels or for the purpose of authentications.
ObC [20] is an architecture to secure these credentials using general secure
hardware, such as the TEE. It consists of the following components:
1. ObC Interpreter is a simplified virtual machine running inside an iso-
lated environment provide by secure hardware, which only allows one
program run at time due to the limited resources on targeting secure
hardware. The program can be deployed by any developers;
2. Credential Manager is a process running outside of secure environment
and interacts with other ObC components, which exposes the ObC
service to CAs;
3. ObC Database also resides outside the secure hardware, which stores
the encrypted credentials;
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4. ObC Provisioning System is a system running inside secure environ-
ment which provisions the installation and usages for credentials.
One example of adopting the TEE secure hardware using TrustZone into the
ObC architecture can seen in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: ObC Architecture on mobile device [6]
ObC interpreter runs inside the TEE. Depending on specific TrustZone
implementations, ObC can be regarded either a simplified TEE OS or just
a normal TA. It isolates the program running inside of it from the resources
provided by the TEE. ObC scheduler at the bottom left of the figure provides
consistent storage for encrypted credentials similar to ObC Database. It also
triggers the interrupt between different programs based on the signal from
the upper layer ObC API call. The functionality of such a ObC system,
including provisioning, execution and sealing, is exported by ObC API.
TEE-backed KeyStore Since Android 4.3 (API level 18), Android pro-
vides a secure container named KeyStore. The KeyStore can keep crypto-
graphic keys away from malicious extractions and unauthorized usages [11].
When a TEE is present in an Android device, the KeyStore system will use
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the TEE to store the keys instead of using a software implementation. The
TEE in here mainly stands for the TEE provided by vendors which does
not share common API interfaces. The TEE defined in GP can achieve the
same functionality as the KeyStore system. First of all, the keys stored in
GP-compliant TEE are also tamper-proof from the untrusted outside world
excluding valid CAs. Moreover, the feature of key usage authentications is
provided during opening a session to a TA in which the CA must validate
itself to the TA by providing correct authentication data. However, the API
provided by GP TEE Client API opens a wider implementation possibility.
Linux generic TEE subsystem is a TEE driver available for the GP-
compliant TEE, which is released in a Linux kernel patch [19]. It facilitates
communication between the TEE and REE. Via the normal usage of a Linux
driver, such as open, ioctl and close, the untrusted world can implement the
GP TEE Client API based on these calls.
2.5 GlobalPlatform (GP) TEE Client Speci-
fication
GP is a non-profit organization that publishes specifications to promote se-
curity and interoperability of secure devices. One of the specifications it
publishes, the “GlobalPlatform Device Technology TEE Client API Spec-
ification“ (GP TEE Client API) [7], standardizes the ways in which CAs
communicate with the TEE and TAs. All its APIs are showed in Table 2.1.
And data structures are presented in Listing 2.1. GP also has other specifi-
cations aimed for TEEs but we only focus on this one specifically since it is
the foundation of our Java API. This specification defines the C data types
and API functions for CAs to utilize. The C style specification can pro-
vide more rich information compared with other programming languages. In
addition, most low level components are implemented using C, for instance
Linux drivers. So C data types and APIs are directly used to dealing with
such components which can be more compatible. Since how to deploy TAs
and extra access controls are not mentioned in GP TEE Client API, they are
also omitted from the OT-J.










Table 2.1: GP TEE Client API
1 typede f s t r u c t
{
3 void ∗ bu f f e r ;
s i z e t s i z e ;
5 u in t 32 t f l a g s ;
<Implementation−Defined Type> imp ;
7 } TEEC SharedMemory ;
9 typede f s t r u c t
{
11 TEEC SharedMemory∗ parent ;
s i z e t s i z e ;
13 s i z e t o f f s e t ;
} TEEC RegisteredMemoryReference ;
15
typede f s t r u c t
17 {
u in t 32 t a ;
19 u in t 32 t b ;




TEEC TempMemoryReference tmpref ;
25 TEEC RegisteredMemoryReference memref ;
TEEC Value value ;
27 } TEEC Parameter ;
29 typede f s t r u c t
{
31 u in t 32 t s t a r t ed ;
u i n t 32 t paramTypes ;
33 TEEC Parameter params [ 4 ] ;
<Implementation−Defined Type> imp ;
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35 } TEEC Operation ;
Listing 2.1: GP data types [7]
2.6 Open-TEE
Open-TEE [22] is an open-source virtual TEE which is a software implemen-
tation based on the GP TEE Specifications with no dependency on specific
TEE hardware. It provides the standardized API defined in GP TEE Client
API specification. For devices which are not equipped with a real hardware-
based TEE, it can allow developers to debug TAs before building them for a
real TEE. Figure 2.3 shows Open-TEE architecture.
Its main entry called opentee-engine is an executable file which launches
two Linux daemons (Manager and Launcher).
Manager functions as a TEE OS whose responsibilities include dealing
with connections to Launcher and TAs, monitoring their states and providing
resources for TAs. CAs can utilize the pre-agreed socket file to communicate
with it using GP TEE Client API which is wrapped into an extra library
named libtee.
Launcher is responsible for deploying TAs which normally come with the
form of an Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) shared library object.
Following the zygote design pattern, it can create TAs very efficiently by
preloading shared libraries. All the TAs are only loaded once before the
start of Open-TEE.
2.7 OmniShare TA
OmniShare [29] is an application enables sharing encrypted cloud storage
between different authenticated devices [29]. To encrypt the data in cloud
storage, it has a root key used to generate directory keys which then encrypt
the files under that directory. The root key can be regarded as the master key
which must be stored in a place protected by the TEE. So the OmniShare TA
is developed to manage the master key. It can generate the root key inside
of Open-TEE and corresponding directory keys. It also provides two basic
encryption and decryption operations. Currently it uses open authentication
for a prototyping purpose.
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2.8 SEAndroid
SEAndroid is short for Security Enhanced Android which introduces Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC) to Android. The Android security mode is en-
hanced in two places. The first one is in the application permission layer.
For each application, the developers have to specify the permissions the ap-
plication requires which are stored in a manifest file, such as making a phone
call or accessing to the Internet. In addition, before the installation of the
application, the user must specify what permissions are allowed for this ap-
plication. Due to the fact that Android uses the Linux kernel as its basic
foundations, a process isolation and sandboxing mechanism provided by its
kernel can also enhance the Android security mode. Before Android 4.2,
its Linux kernel only provides Discretionary Access Control (DAC). Due to
the shortcomings of the DAC, SELinux [21] is introduced by the National
Security Agency to provide MAC for the Linux. So they decided to apply
SELinux to the Linux kernel of Android which leads to the SEAndroid. By
adopting the existing Android security mode as mentioned above, they have
made the following changes to the Android:
1. Applying the SELinux to the Linux kernel of Android;
2. Offering a set of middleware MAC extensions to the application per-
mission layer.
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Figure 2.3: Open-TEE Architecture [22]
Chapter 3
Design Overview
This chapter lists all requirements that OT-J should meet in order to evaluate
its functionality and usability. In addition, it also presents a system overview
of our solution to demonstrate how to make use of OT-J to achieve the
original purpose without dealing with native code development.
3.1 Requirements
We identify the following criteria as the requirements for OT-J.
R1: Compliance As a Java wrapper for the GP TEE Client API, OT-J
should achieve the same functionality as the GP TEE Client API.
R2: Java Convention OT-J targets the Java developers. So it should
conform to Java conventions.
R3: Ease-of-use No need to deal with native code in the development
process of CAs.
Another important criteria is performance which is often brought to front
when proposing a solution. But it is omitted in here. The reason is that
the prototype implementation which is used to evaluate the Java API uses
Open-TEE as the GP-compliant TEE. As stated in section 2.6, Open-TEE
is a not a real hardware assisted GP-compliant TEE. So the performance
can be different when dealing with the GP-compliant TEEs equipped with
hardware components.
19
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3.2 System Model
See in figure 3.1, the system model of the proposed solution consists of six
components:
Java CA the potion of its code to interact with a TEE/TA is written
purely in Java.
OT-J Adaptor is the realization of OT-J. The effort of native code de-
velopment and transformation between the Java API and C API happen in
here. It may consists of many small libraries due to different use cases. An
example can be seen in our prototype implementation in Chapter 5. The
OT-J can be shared among different CAs so that a duplication of efforts can
be avoided.
Libtee is a native library which implements the GP TEE Client API. It
communicates with a TEE via the GP TEE Core API on behalf of CAs and
exposes GP Client C API to upper layer OT-J. Then the OT-J can interact
with it using the Java Native Interface (JNI). The Libtee is specific to a
particular GP-compliant TEE.
REE OS at the bottom of the left side is an Android OS;
TEE OS on the right side must be GP-compliant which means its imple-
mentation must conform to the GP TEE Core API specification[9] so that
the Libtee can interact with it.
Native TA contains a set of operations which can be utilized by CAs.
There are different ways to implement this general architecture based on
different use cases. For instance, Chapter 5 describes one type of implemen-
tations in the context of Android development and Open-TEE. Due to the
integration of Android components, its architecture is more complex but still
follows this general architecture as proposed in this chapter.
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Figure 3.1: System model with Java API OT-J
Chapter 4
API Design
This chapter describes the design philosophy behind the OT-J which is based
on the GP TEE Client API (see in table 2.1). Some notions, such as context,
session and shared memory etc, also originate from it. These entities do have
similar meanings in our context. A more detailed explanation can be found
in the descriptions for each of them.
In general, a CA wants to utilize functions that a TA provides. To meet
its needs, OT-J provides two kinds of functions for the CAs:
1. Communication schemes with a TEE/TA. They are the first and last
API for a CA to utilize;
2. Data exchange scheme. After a connection has been successfully estab-
lished, they can be used to define how the data should be encapsulated
and exchanged between a CA and a TEE/TA.
Any abortion or failure of these functions may lead to an inconsistent
state between the CA and the TEE/TA. So there is a set of exception classes
which are used to indicate such a scenario. As usual, it is the developers’
responsibility to handle these exceptions if they occur. The complete OT-J
is presented in Appendix A.
4.1 Motivating Example
In order to help explain OT-J, two block of example codes which achieve
the same functionality are brought for comparisons. Listing 4.1 example
code uses GP TEE Client API and Listing 4.2 utilizes OT-J. The detailed
descriptions about the example code are distributed into different sections as
followed. For the clarity , these Listings do not show all the parameters of
each API.
22
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1 TEEC Result r e t ;
TEEC Context context = {0} ;
3 TEEC SharedMemory shared memory = {0} ;
TEEC Session s e s s i o n = {0} ;
5 TEEC Operation operat i on = {0} ;
u i n t 32 t r e tOr i g i n ;
7
r e t = TEEC Init ia l i zeContext (&context , . . . ) ;
9 i f ( r e t != TEEC SUCCESS ) re turn r e t ;
11 r e t = TEEC RegisterSharedMemory(&context , &shared memory , . . . ) ;
i f ( r e t != TEEC SUCCESS ) re turn r e t ;
13
r e t = TEEC OpenSession(&context , &se s s i on , . . . ) ;
15 i f ( r e t != TEEC SUCCESS ) re turn r e t ;
17 opera t ion . params [ 0 ] . memref . parent = &shared memory ;
opera t i on . params [ 1 ] . va lue . a = a ;
19 opera t ion . params [ 1 ] . va lue . b = b ;
21 r e t = TEEC InvokeCommand(&se s s i on , CMDDO ENC, &operat ion , &
re tOr i g i n ) ;
i f ( r e t != TEEC SUCCESS ) re turn r e t ;
23
TEEC CloseSession(& s e s s i o n ) ;
25
TEEC ReleaseSharedMemory(&shared memory ) ;
27
TEEC FinalizeContext(&context ) ;
Listing 4.1: GP TEE Client API example code
t ry {
2 ITEEClient . IContext context = c l i e n t . i n i t i a l i z eC o n t e x t ( . . . ) ;
4 ITEEClient . ISharedMemory sharedMemory = context .
registerSharedMemory ( bu f f e r , . . . ) ;
6 ITEEClient . I S e s s i o n s e s s i o n = context . openSess ion ( . . . ) ;
8 ITEEClient . IValue value = c l i e n t . newValue (a , b , . . . ) ;
ITEEClient . IRegisteredMemoryReference rmr = c l i e n t .
newRegisteredMemoryReference ( sharedMemory , . . . ) ;
10
ITEEClient . IOperat ion operat ion = c l i e n t . newOperation ( rmr ,
va lue ) ;
12
s e s s i o n . invokeCommand(CMDDO ENC, operat i on ) ;
14
CHAPTER 4. API DESIGN 24
s e s s i o n . c l o s e S e s s i o n ( ) ;
16
context . releaseSharedMemory ( sharedMemory ) ;
18
context . f i n a l i z eCon t e x t ( ) ;
20 }
catch ( TEEClientException e )
22 {
// handl ing except ion here .
24 r e tOr i g i n = e . getReturnOrig in ( ) ;
}
Listing 4.2: OT-J example code
4.2 Communication Scheme
GP TEE Client API has the notion of a context to a TEE and sessions to
individual TAs. They stand for the handle to the connections to a TEE
or TAs in the communication scheme. Their relationships are described in
figure 4.1. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the ultimate goal for
the communication scheme is to enable the interactions between a CA and
TAs running inside of a TEE.
Figure 4.1: Relationship between context and session
Preparation Before any interaction with a remote TEE/TA happens, the
CA must prepare its own environment by calling a factory method new-
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TEEClient(), which will return an ITEEClient interface (see the client vari-
able in line no.2 of Listing 4.2). This interface acts as the main entrance to
OT-J. More information about it can be found in the OT-J documentation
in the appendix. For the GP TEE Client API, developers have to link to a
particular Libtee which is specific for the TEE.
4.2.1 Context
The context is a general abstraction of a basic communication layer between
a CA and a remote TEE. All interactions of a CA with a remote TEE must
happen in a valid context.
In GP TEE Client API, there is one data structure noted as TEEC Context
acting as a handle to an initialized context within a TEE. Based on C pro-
gramming convention, a valid TEEC Context instance must be passed to
several C API calls, such as TEEC FinalizeContext, TEEC OpenSession and
TEEC RegisterSharedMemory.
In OT-J, the context comes as a form of IContext interface under ITEEClient
interface.
4.2.1.1 Initializing a context
To establish a connection to a TEE, a context must be initialized within the
TEE. In case there are multiple TEEs residing in one mobile device and the
Libtee supports each of them, the CA must specify which TEE it wants to
connect to by giving the name of TEE. If the name is empty, the context will
be initialized in a default TEE.
In GP TEE Client API, the TEEC InitializeContext API is used to ini-
tialize a new context. Based on the return code (a TEEC Result instance)
from the API call, it can be determined whether a valid TEEC Context in-
stance has been initialized or not (see line no.9 of Listing 4.1).
However, it is a different form of use in the OT-J. To initialize a context,
a method initializeContext must be called from the returned ITEEClient
instance obtained in the preparation process (see line no.2 of Listing 4.2). If
this call succeeds, a valid IContext interface will be returned as such a valid
context has been initialized in a remote TEE. If not, a TEEClientException
will be thrown. For the discussion of the thrown exception, please refer to
4.4. An IContext interface defines all the API functions in which a valid
context is needed, including:
1. finalize the context (see 4.2.1.2);
2. open a session (see 4.2.2.1);
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3. register shared memory (see 4.3.1.1);
4. release shared memory (see 4.3.1.3).
4.2.1.2 Finalizing a context
If there is not need to interact with the TEE, all shared resources must be
released and the context must be finalized. In GP TEE Client API, the
TEEC FinializeContext must be called by providing a valid context handle
initialized previously (see line no.28 of Listing 4.1). In OT-J, the finalize-
Context function defined in the IContext interface must be called (see line
no.19 of Listing 4.2).
4.2.1.3 Requesting cancellation
There are two APIs where an operation can be involved: open session and
invoke command. The description of the operation can be found in section
4.3.4. If one of these two APIs takes a long time for the TEE/TA to process,
it is possible for the CA to cancel the function call. We assume that one
thread is making one of these two API function calls. This thread will be
blocked util the TEE/TA finished and returned. At the same time, when
the thread is blocked, another thread can cancel the API function call by
making a request cancellation call by referencing the same operation param-
eter. In GP TEE Client API, the TEEC RequestCancellation function takes
a TEEC Operation as its only parameter. In OT-J, the corresponding API
is called requestCancellation in a valid IContext which also consumes only
one IOperation instance.
4.2.2 Sessions
There are possible many TAs running inside of a TEE. It is necessary to
provide another layer on top of the context to enhance the access control for
each connection from the CA to a TA. The session is an abstraction of the
communication layer between a CA and a TA on top of a valid context. So
a session is valid only in a context. All interactions with a TA must happen
in a valid session.
4.2.2.1 Opening a session
In general, to communicate with a remote TA, a session must be opened.
Before opening a session, the CA must have enough knowledge about the
TA that it wants to talk to, such as the Universally unique identifier (UUID)
CHAPTER 4. API DESIGN 27
of the TA. What’s more, the CA must provide correct data to authenticate
itself to the TA. This can be done by making an agreement on authentication
data with the TA beforehand. During opening a session, the corresponding
authentication data then can be passed to the TA. Of course, these data
must be encapsulated using a scheme stated in the next section. Giving any
incorrect data will lead to a failure of the open-session operation.
In GP TEE Client API, the TEEC Session structure is used to hold the
handle to a session. It can be only obtained by making a TEEC OpenSession
API call (see line no.14 of Listing 4.1). In order to get a valid session handle, a
valid context handle must be given to the API. In addition, along with the au-
thentication data, a TEEC UUID of the target TA with which the CA needs
to interact must also be provided. In later interactions with the TA, which
require a valid session handle, previously returned TEEC Session must be
passed into corresponding API functions, such as TEEC CloseSession and
TEEC InvokeCommand.
In OT-J, we use ISession as a handle to a session. There is no need
to pass the ISession instance to any API function. Instead, these functions
which need the involvements of the session are all defined in the ISession
interface, such as closeSession and invokeCommand. They are only valid
when a valid ISession is present. A valid ISession can be only obtained
by calling the openSession function in a valid IContext along with correct
authentication data (see line no.6 of Listing 4.2).
4.2.2.2 Closing a session
When there is no further interaction with the TA, the corresponding session
should be closed to release occupied resources. There is one API function
named TEEC CloseSession in GP TEE Client API. The only parameter it
consumes is a TEEC Session instance (see line no.24 of Listing 4.1). There
is no return value to indicate the status of close-session operation. So after
this function call, the TEEC Session must not be reused. In OT-J, to close
a specific session, the function closeSession which takes no parameter in the
related ISession must be called (see line no.15 of Listing 4.2). It also make
no guarantee that the session can be closed successfully. But the ISession
must not be reused again too.
4.2.2.3 Invoking a command
Once a session is opened to a target TA, to ask the TA to perform a specific
operation, the CA can tell TA what to do by invoking a command specified
with a command id corresponding to a pre-agreed operation. So before that, a
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TA must define a list of commands that a CA can invoke. For each command
to invoke, it is possible that there are input or output parameters involved.
All the parameters are wrapped in an operation which is discussed in section
4.3.4.
In GP TEE Client API, there is one API named TEEC InvokeCommand
to perform an invoke-command operation (see line no.21 of Listing 4.1). A
valid TEEC Context and TEEC Session must be provided to this API along
with the command id and an optional TEEC Operation.
In OT-J, the function invokeCommand is defined in the ISession inter-
face. As long as the session is valid, this function can be called by providing
only the command id and an operation (see line no.13 of Listing 4.2).
For the return status of this invoke-command operation which is indicated
by two values (TEEC Result and return origin code) in GP TEE Client API,
please refer back to the section 4.4.
4.2.3 Summary
This chapter describes the communication scheme for a CA to interact with
a TEE/TA. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the state of the TEE when each API is
called. The following section presents how data can be exchanged between
the CA and the TEE/TA.
4.3 Data Exchange Scheme
In the normal computing world, there are two general approaches to transfer
data information between two processes: message passing or shared mem-
ory. The first one is passing byte stream via the interfaces provided by OSs.
This approach is only efficient if the byte stream is small enough since the
CPU needs to copy the byte stream back and forth between two processes.
Another approach is to share a memory space between two different threads
within a single process thus avoiding copying the data. Normal OSs only
allow one process access to its own memory space for security concerns. But
Android allows two processes to share memory spaces within the same ap-
plication sandbox using ashmem. Under such a circumstance, it is possible
to share memory space between two threads/processes but with inevitable
computational overheads. As a result, this approach is better than the first
one if the data to be shared is quite big due to bigger computation efforts of
the first solution. To improve the efficiency of data transmission, both ap-
proaches should be taken into consideration and one can choose the approach
which fits his/her situations.
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Figure 4.2: Communication Scheme State Machine
These two approaches also apply in the context of TEE since the CA
and TA are also processes. So it is crucial to support data transmission
between them. The first approach is quite generic in the GP TEE Client
API. Different input parameters are copied to/from the TEE/TA when each
API is called by the CA. The second approach is mapped to a notion called
shared memory (see in section 4.3.1).
Once the ways to interact with the TEE/TA are defined, it is necessary
to show the data exchange scheme which enables data flow between the CA
and the TEE/TA. The data exchange scheme defines what type of data
can be exchanged between CAs and TEE/TAs, and how data should be
encapsulated. There are direct data containers and indirect data containers
(see in figure 4.3). Direct data containers are the smallest structure which
can be referred or encapsulated by indirect data containers. They consists
of:
1. shared memory is a block of memory in a CA which is shared with a
TEE/TA to avoid memory copy back and forth (see section 4.3.1);
2. value pair contains two integer values (see section 4.3.2);
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3. UUID is short for universally unique identifier which is used by CAs
to specify which TA it wants to interact with during open session. So
it must be unique with a TEE (see section 4.3.5).
Excluding the UUID, these direct data containers can not be directly trans-
ferred between CAs and TEE/TAs. They must be encapsulated in a hierar-
chy manner, which results in several levels of encapsulations. The motivation
of indirect data containers is to provide more flexibility to use the direct data
containers and data structure isolations. The outcome of the hierarchy en-
capsulations are the following indirect data containers:
1. Registered memory reference (see section 4.3.1.2);
2. Parameter (in section 4.3.3)
3. Operation (in section 4.3.4)
It is possible for indirect data containers adding metadata to extend the
usage of encapsulated data containers. One example can be found in section
4.3.1.2.
Figure 4.3: Data encapsulation hierarchy
The following two lists are the data types defined in GP TEE Client API
and corresponding data interfaces in OT-J. More detailed descriptions about
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the transformations from C data types to Java interfaces are discussed in the
following sections.
1 i n t e r f a c e ISharedMemory {
i n t TEECMEM INPUT = 0x00000001 ;
3 i n t TEECMEMOUTPUT = 0x00000002 ;
i n t ge tF lags ( ) ;
5 byte [ ] asByteArray ( ) ;
}
7
i n t e r f a c e IRegisteredMemoryReference extends IParameter{
9 enum Flag{
TEECMEMREF INPUT(0 x0000000D ) ,
11 TEECMEMREFOUTPUT(0 x0000000E ) ,
TEECMEMREF INOUT(0 x0000000F ) ;
13
i n t id ;
15 Flag ( i n t id ) { t h i s . id = id ;}
}
17 ITEEClient . ISharedMemory getSharedMemory ( ) ;
i n t g e tO f f s e t ( ) ;
19 i n t getReturnSize ( ) ;
}
21
i n t e r f a c e IValue extends IParameter{
23 enum Flag{
TEEC VALUE INPUT(0 x00000001 ) ,
25 TEECVALUEOUTPUT(0 x00000002 ) ,
TEEC VALUE INOUT(0 x00000003 ) ;
27
i n t id ;
29 Flag ( i n t id ) { t h i s . id = id ;}
}
31 i n t getA ( ) ;
i n t getB ( ) ;
33 }
35 i n t e r f a c e IParameter{
enum Type{
37 TEEC PTYPE VAL(0 x00000001 ) ,
TEEC PTYPE RMR(0 x00000002 ) ;
39
i n t id ;
41 Type ( i n t id ) { t h i s . id = id ;}
}
43 Type getType ( ) ;
}
45
i n t e r f a c e IOperat ion {
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47 boolean i s S t a r t e d ( ) ;
}
Listing 4.3: Java data interfaces
4.3.1 Shared memory
The notion of shared memory in GP TEE Client API specification [7] is a
design to enable data transfer between a CA and a TA. Firstly, a block of
memory within the CA must be registered as a shared memory to a TA. Then
the TA can also operate on it. Note that all shared memory are CA driven
which means the actual memory space containing the share memory are only
located in the CA. The reason is that normally TAs only have limited memory
spaces and it is also dangerous to allow CAs to operate on the memory space
of TAs from the perspective of security concerns. Since the memory space
resides in the CA, the CA can use it freely whether it is registered as a
shared memory or not. The access control of this shared memory for the TA
is enhanced by providing indication flags during the action of registering the
shared memory. After it has been released, the TA will no longer neither
read its content nor write to it. The notion shared memory is represented
as TEEC SharedMemory in GP TEE Client API (see line no.1-7 of Listing
2.1) and ISharedMemory in OT-J (see line no.1-6 of Listing 4.3). For the
constraints caused by real world implementation environment, please refer
to section 5.3.
4.3.1.1 Register shared memory
As stated above, to allow a TA to access the shared memory, the CA must reg-
ister it to the TA. In GP TEE Client API, the TEEC RegisterSharedMemory
must be called (see line no.11 of Listing 4.1) by giving a valid TEEC Context
and uninitialized TEEC SharedMemory. The related function in OT-J is reg-
isterSharedMemory defined in the IContext interface (see line no.4 of Listing
4.2).
4.3.1.2 Registered memory reference
Once a shared memory is registered, in order to refer the shared memory
to the TA, the CA must encapsulate it into a registered memory reference
(RMR), which is a container for a shared memory and also provides flexibility
to use the shared memory. The RMR is noted as TEEC RegisteredMemoryReference
in GP TEE Client API (see line no.9-14 of Listing 2.1) and IRegisteredMemo-
ryReference in OT-J (see line no.8-20 of Listing 4.3). A TEEC RegisteredMemoryReference
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can be created by just populating its fields. To create an IRegisteredMem-
oryReference, the CA must call newRegisteredMemoryReference which is a
function defined in the ITEEClient interface (see line no.9 of Listing 4.2).
4.3.1.3 Release shared memory
When a shared memory is no longer needed, it should be released so that
the TA can no longer access it. This can be achieved with the help of the
function TEEC ReleaseSharedMemory in GP TEE Client API (see line no.26
of Listing 4.1) and releaseSharedMemory of the IContext interface (see line
no.17 of Listing 4.2).
4.3.2 Value pair
Value pair consists of two integers, which is used to transfer simple data
without the need to register a shared memory. See in figure 4.3. The value
pair must be encapsulated into a parameter to enable its transmissions be-
tween CAs and TAs. It is defined as TEEC Value in GP TEE Client API
(see line no.16-20 of Listing 2.1) and IValue in OT-J (see line no.22-33 of
Listing 4.3). A TEEC Value instance can be created by filling its fields. For
IValue, the function newValue from the ITEEClient interface must be called.
4.3.3 Parameter
Parameter is the smallest unit for an operation (see in next section). In GP
TEE Client API, parameter is represented as a C union called TEEC Parameter
(see line no.22-27 of Listing 2.1). It can be either a TEEC TempMemoryReference,
TEEC RegisteredMemoryReference and TEEC Value. In OT-J, the parame-
ter is an interface called IParameter (see line no.35-44 of Listing 4.3). Since
there is the notion of union in Java, we have defined the IParameter as super
interface for both IRegisteredMemoryReference and IValue. There is no cor-
responding Java data type for TEEC TempMemoryReference. For the reason
why it is omitted, please see section 4.5.1.
4.3.4 Operation
Operation is the only indirect data container which can be directly transmit-
ted between CAs and TAs. The operation can take up to 4 parameters. The
related data structure in GP TEE Client API is TEEC Operation (see line
no.29-35 of Listing 2.1). Excluding the TEEC Parameters it includes, there
are two metadata fields. The first one is started which is used to indicate
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the current status of the TEEC Operation. Another field is paramTypes. It
contains the type of the included TEEC Parameters. Once it is passed into
an either open session or invoke command function call, it can be used to
cancel these two function calls which is either started or in a pending state
within the TEE/TA.
In OT-J, the data type mapped with the operation is IOperation (see
line no.46-48 of Listing 4.3). The started field is transformed to a isStarted
function. The paramTypes field is not needed since it can be implied by the
IParameters it includes.
To create a TEEC Operation instance, the CA just needs to populate
its fields. For our IOperation interface, there are 5 overloaded functions
with the name of newOperation from ITEEClient interface, which take 0 to
4 parameters. The function in line no.11 of Listing 4.2 is one overloaded
function which takes two IParameters.
4.3.5 UUID
UUID is the only direct data container which can be directly transmitted
between CAs and TAs. For the CAs to distinguish the TAs, the UUID of
each TA must be unique within one TEE. It is only needed during open
session to specify which TA the CA wants to connect to. UUID is short for
Universally Unique IDentifier which is defined in RFC4122 [17]. In OT-J,
we take the existing UUID data structure from Java package java.util which
also conforms to the RFC4122 standard.
4.4 Exceptions
The return status of each API function call is indicated in a different way
between C and Java. With the C binding in GP TEE Client API, for those
functions with a return value, the return status is indicated using global
constant values (an unsigned 32-bits integer). For instance, TEEC SUCCESS
is returned if one API call succeeded and there is a return value for it (see
example code in line no.9, 12, 15 and 22 of Listing 4.1). An error code is
returned if failed. There are many error codes defined in the GP TEE Client
API specification. Each error code corresponds to one kind of error.
However, this is implemented differently in OT-J. If one function call
succeeded, a valid interface is returned (see example code in line no.2, 3
and 4 of Listing 4.2). There is no corresponding data structure to map
TEEC SUCCESS. The type of returned interface is different in different func-
tion calls. If failed, an exception will be thrown (see line no.21 of Listing 4.2).
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TEEClientException is the superclass for all exceptions that we have defined.
Each exception extends the TEEClientException and is mapped back to one
error code. So each error code defined in GP TEE Client API specification
has an exception corresponded to it. In our prototype implementation, we
also re-threw the exceptions coming from Android to our own exceptions.
For TEEC OpenSession and TEEC InvokeCommand functions in GP
TEE Client API, there is another field called return origin (an unsigned
32-bit integer) used to indicate the original location of the error (see line
no.24 of Listing 4.1). Currently, there are four global constant values for this
field:
1. TEEC ORIGIN API ;
2. TEEC ORIGIN COMMS ;
3. TEEC ORIGIN TEE ;
4. TEEC ORIGIN TRUSTED APP.
In OT-J, these four values are transformed into an enum named ReturnO-
riginCode. When an exception is thrown from these two functions above,
the CA can know the origin of the error by calling the function called getRe-
turnOrigin in the thrown exception (see line no.16 of Listing 4.2).
4.5 Omitted Data Types and Functions
Due to the different environments in which the GP TEE Client API and
OT-J operate, the following two concepts have been omitted in OT-J.
4.5.1 TEEC TempMemoryReference
In GP TEE Client API, TEEC TempMemoryReference is another way of
sharing a block of memory within a CA to a TA, which is similar with
TEEC SharedMemory, both with a buffer, size field and corresponding flags
to indicate the I/O direction. However, unlike TEEC SharedMemory, the
TEEC TempMemoryReference is only valid for one time operation which
means it cannot be reused by TAs in a sequence of operations. In other
words, the same TEEC TempMemoryReference will be regarded as different
instances in TAs. The major benefit of the TEEC TempMemoryReference is
that it can avoid two operations which are mandatory for TEEC SharedMemory :
TEEC RegisterSharedMemory and TEEC ReleaseSharedMemory. In addi-
tion, TEEC TempMemoryReference can be used directly in the TEEC Parameter.
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But the TEEC SharedMemory needs to be encapsulated into a TEEC RegisteredMemoryReference
which, then, can be used in the TEEC Parameter. The biggest drawback of
the TEEC TempMemoryReference is non reusable. This can be problematic
when the same TEEC TempMemoryReference is used for many times. For a
TEE to map a memory space that a TEEC TempMemoryReference referred
from the CA to a TA, (how the TEE maps the memory space corresponds
to real world implementations), there is computation cost for this opera-
tion. The computation cost will become considerably larger when the same
TEEC TempMemoryReference is used frequently. Since the TEEC SharedMemory
is reusable, there is no such an issue for it. So for the simplicity of OT-J,
we have decided to remove the TEEC TempMemoryReference and recom-
mended using the TEEC SharedMemory instead.
4.5.2 TEEC AllocateSharedMemory
The TEEC AllocateSharedMemory will allocate a new memory space as a
shared memory but the TEEC RegisterSharedMemory registers an existing
memory space as a shared memory instead. One TEEC AllocateSharedMemory
API call can finish the following two tasks in a line:
1. allocating a block of memory in the CA;
2. making a TEEC RegisterSharedMemory API call.
This can be helpful since this API can allocate the memory space for the
CA without the CA directly to do so. The allocated memory can be ex-
plicitly freed during the TEEC ReleaseSharedMemory. This API can free
C developers from dealing with memory allocations. But it is different
in Java. The deallocation of memory space is controlled by Java Virtual
Machine (JVM) which adopts Java garbage collection mechanism. Even
there is still one reference to the allocated shared memory, it will not be
freed by the JVM. This can be troublesome. Consider the case that dur-
ing the usage of the shared memory, it has been passed to another Java
object. After the CA called the TEEC ReleaseSharedMemory, that Java
object still hold the reference to the shared memory. So it will not be
freed by JVM. However the TEEC ReleaseSharedMemory is dedicated to
do so. This is not a problem in C because C developers can explicitly free
the memory space by system provided functions, such as free. Since the
functionality of the TEEC AllocateSharedMemory can be achieved using the
TEEC RegisterSharedMemory, along with the concerns in Java, we have de-
cided not to map TEEC AllocateSharedMemory C API to OT-J.
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4.6 Summary
The UML diagram of our complete OT-J is presented in figure 4.4. All the
data types and API functions are mapped into OT-J. For those omitted, they
are explained in section 4.5. To minimize mutability, all the data types in OT-
J are represented as public interfaces. All interactions with a data type are
predefined in the interface. This hides implementation details, which offer the
flexibility for the underlying core library development. In addition, possible
exceptions which will be thrown by each function are well documented.
Figure 4.4: OT-J UML Diagram
Chapter 5
Prototype Implementation
To prove the usability of our Java API, we have created a prototype im-
plementation with the Java API fully realized. This chapter describes the
principles and design decisions behind implementing the key concepts, such
as shared memory, based on the Android architecture. Due to constraints of
Andriod, the real implementations of these concepts have been leveraged to
achieve the maximum functionality and compatibility.
5.1 Overview
As stated previously, Open-TEE is quite useful in the early stage of devel-
oping CAs and TAs. Developers can use it for debugging purposes before
deploying the TAs into a real TEE. The reason why we choose Open-TEE
is that it is GP-complaint TEE solution which is compatible with the GP
TEE Client API so with our Java API. Using already existing GP-compliant
TEE components can allow us put more focus on our own Java API im-
plementations. The figure 5.1 is the overall architecture for the prototype
implementation.
In general, we deploy Open-TEE within an Android application and ex-
pose its functionality as an Android service which is named as TEE proxy
service. This service is responsible for
1. deploying Open-TEE and TAs for only once;
2. communicating with Open-TEE using provided NativeLibtee library;
3. handling service requests from CAs and providing resource isolations
between these CAs.
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Figure 5.1: Prototype Implementation Architecture
As stated in the Chapter 2, the main entrance of Open-TEE is opentee-
engine which is the output after building Open-TEE against the Android
source tree. It can be directly run as an Android process. If it is launched
within one application, other processes running within the same application
can use the Libtee to communicate with it by using a pre-agreed socket file.
But other applications cannot communicate with it due to the SEAndroid
[28] restrictions which do not allow socket communication between different
applications. In order to comply with the SEAndroid restrictions, we decided
to deploy Open-TEE within an application which uses Libtee to communicate
with it. By adopting this application to an Android service, other applica-
tions are also able to interact with Open-TEE via Android Binder.
The work flow of the implementation is:
the TEEC proxy service deploys Open-TEE and TAs running in a user
mode;
the TEEC proxy service exposes its service to CAs using self-defined
AIDL interfaces;
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CAs connect to the TEEC proxy service using provided otclient library.
Recall our solution hierarchy presented in figure 3.1. This prototype imple-
mentation architecture can be categorized into the following components:
Java CA : Application #1 and #2 which are developed purely in Java
and they both want to interact with Native TAs;
OT-J Adaptor : otclient library which implements the Java API and com-
municates with the remote TEE service using Android Inter-process Commu-
nication (IPC) call, TEE proxy service that exposes its service to Application
#1 and #2 together with resource isolations, and NativeLibtee implementing
the Java call from TEE proxy service in C;
Libtee : Libtee which came with Open-TEE and communicates with Open-
TEE via GP Core API;
REE OS : Android OS;
TEE OS : Open-TEE a GP-compliant TEE;
Native TAs : TAs running in Open-TEE, which are developed in native
code.
The following sections describe more detailed implementations of key con-
cepts issued in both the GP TEE Client API and Java API.
5.2 Java API Implementation
The otclient is a full implementation of our Java API. It is responsible for
monitoring the mapped resources with the remote TEE proxy service. For
each Java API function, there are one or two Inter-process communication
(IPC) call(s) related with it. Two IPC calls are needed for some Java APIs
which can allow the TEE proxy service to notify the CA (an example can be
found in section 5.3). Benefiting from the synchronous feature of IPC call,
implemented Java API is also synchronous which is conformed to GP TEE
Client API specification. The figure 5.2 is the calling sequence behind one
Java API call.
1. step 1: CA makes a function call f1 defined in our Java API, such as
initializeContext ;
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2. step 2: otclient issues an IPC call f2 related to f1 ;
3. step 3: the corresponding GP TEE Client API function mapped to f2
is called;
4. step 4: Libtee internal call to Open-TEE;
5. step 5: function call returns.
Figure 5.2: API synchronization
Note that all exceptions that the CA can receive are thrown by the ot-
client, which are determined by the error code and possible return origin
code given by each IPC call. Since the otclient is making Android IPC call,
it can get a standard android.os.RemoteException which is re-thrown by the
otclient as a CommunicationException).
5.3 Shared Memory Implementation
As stated in section 4.3.1, the shared memory is a block of memory within
a CA which can be shared with a TA. In our implementation, the CA is
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an Android application. It is challenging to share a memory block between
different Android applications due to the sandbox mechanism of Android.
One possible solution is using a kernel driver called ashmem but it only
allow share memory blocks within one application among different processes.
Thus we turn to the second solution. Instead of directly mapping memory
block from a CA to a TA, for one shared memory, we have two memory blocks
corresponding to it. One is in the CA and another one in the TEE proxy
service. To fulfill the requirements issued in GP TEE Client API specification
for shared memory, we only need to synchronize these two memory blocks
before and after each API call.
5.3.1 Memory Synchronization
The memory synchronization is achieved by copying the content of the shared
memory back and forth between a CA and the proxy service. For how to
transfer shared memory via Binder driver, please see section 5.4. Since it is
expensive to transfer data in the IPC call, our implementation only copies
the content of the shared memory under the following two circumstances:
1. copy the shared memory from the CA to TA if its flag is input for the
TA;
2. copy the shared memory from the TA to CA if its flag is output for the
TA;
5.4 Data Serialization
Without direct mapping of memory blocks, all the data must be passed
through Android Binder driver. According to [13], not all the data types
can be directly transmitted via Binder especially those self-defined classes.
There are two methods to solve this problem. Both of them are used in our
implementation. The first one is implementing Parcelable interface for each
class as stated in [13]. Moreover, an extra AIDL file related to each class also
have to be added. This method is used in transmitting the shared memory
named OTSharedMemory which implements the ISharedMemory interface.
There is another approach to transmit self-defined classes between a CA
and the proxy service by introducing the protocol buffers [14]. Since the byte
array can be directly transferred via IPC call, using the built-in serialization
functions of protocol buffers can help us serialize self-defined classes into a
byte array. After the byte array is transmitted, these classes can be recreated
also using the built-in parsing functions of the protocol buffers. One challenge
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with this approach is that the size of the serialized data can change after the
classes it holds have been modified. If the size increases, it is impossible for
the Binder to sync it back to the other side using the original byte array
reference if the byte array is specified to do so. To solve this issue, we uses
an extra IPC for synchronizing the bigger byte array back, which explains
why some APIs are mapped with two IPC calls as stated above.
This is how it works in our implementations. A caller transfers the byte
array to a callee along with a callback function which is the second IPC call.
Then the callee modifies the byte array which leads to a lager size of byte
array compared with the original one. The callee can sync the larger byte
array to the caller using the callback function provided previously by the
caller. The operation named OTOperation in our context which implements
the IOperation interface is transmitted using this method. The main contri-
bution of this approach is that it eases the data manipulations between C
and Java. An example is that one byte array can be parsed into correct C
structs and Java classes. Consider the case when a CA serializes an OTOp-
eration and transmits it to the proxy service. The proxy service then pass
it from Java layer to Java Native Interface (JNI) layer which is written in
C. The OTOperation in a byte array then can be translated into C type of
operation. Without the help of the protocol buffers, we have to either im-
plement our own serialization solutions just like protocol buffers which is a
duplication of efforts, or access different fields of the OTOperation to create
an TEEC Operation instance which is hard to deal with and error-prone due
to the JNI development conventions.
5.5 Multiplexing
The TEE proxy service can allow multiple CAs to connect to it. The requests
coming from CAs will end up in the same Open-TEE. So a multiplexing
solution must be given between the proxy service and Open-TEE to guarantee
resource isolations coming from different CAs. The CAs can be distinguished
by the proxy service using their Process Identifier (PID).
There are two solutions to this issue. The first approach which we have
taken is presented in figure 5.1. Application #1 has a shared memory noted
as #1 and a session s1. Another application Application #2 also has a
shared memory #2 and a session s2. Within the TEE proxy service, an
OTGuard is responsible for the resource isolations. For each CA, there is an
OTCaller in the OTGuard related to it. All the resources of one CA which
are shared with the TEE/TAs are wrapped in one OTCaller. Although
all shared memory (#1 and #2 ) and sessions (s1 and s2 ) are terminated
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within the same NativeLibtee, benefiting from the upper layer isolations, one
CA still not be able to access the resources belonging to another CA. Since
this isolation is achieved by the software implementation, we regard it as a
weak isolation which is not ideal.
Another approach which can provide a stronger isolation is moving the
duty of resource isolations from the TEE proxy service to Open-TEE. Al-
though all resources also ended up within the same NativeLibtee, by opening
one libtee for each CA, resources will be mapped into corresponding context
within Open-TEE. It is inevitable for the NativeLibtee to deal with resource
indexing just like what the OTGuard does. This approach is better than the
first one because of using different contexts for different CAs. In the first
approach, there is only one context for all resources from different CAs. So
Open-TEE regards them as resources coming from one CA. However, this
approach guarantees that one CA can have its own context in Open-TEE.
Resources from different CAs can be isolated by Open-TEE.
During the real world implementation, both approaches are applicable.
Since the main focus of this thesis is about developing Java API, the proto-
type implementation just need to prove the usability of the API. So it does
not matter which approach is implemented in here as long as it can achieve
the goal of resource isolations.
Chapter 6
Evaluation
Based on our prototype implementation, we hereby evaluate the usability
of the OT-J according to the requirements defined in section 3.1. For the
development environment, please see in table 6.1.
6.1 R1: Compliance
The first requirement is that the OT-J must provide full coverage of the
functionality defined in the GP TEE Client API. After testing each Java
API, it will make sense to combine them to achieve specific goals. As men-
tioned in Section 2.7, OmniShare is an application to share encrypted cloud
storage between authenticated devices. It holds a master key to decrypt the
encrypted cloud storage, which is currently stored using the Android Key-
Chain system. Since a GP-compliant TEE can provide integrity protection
and secure storage services, the OmniShare TA was developed to provide
this feature for the master key. It uses public authentication and has sev-
eral predefined commands that a CA can invoke, for instance generating a
private key, encrypting and decrypting data. So we have one Android test
application called OmniShare tester (see in figure 6.1) which utilizes the OT-
J and is developed purely in Java as the CA to use the functionality that
OmniShare TA provides. It can be regarded as either Application #1 or #2
Debug device Nexus 6 running Android 5.1.1
Development tool Android Studio 2.0
TEE Open-TEE
TA OmniShare TA
Table 6.1: Development Environment
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in figure 5.1. The OmniShare tester has the following six buttons attached
with six corresponding operations and multiple Java API calls are involved
in each operation:
Create Root Key button asks the OmniShare TA to generate a root
key for later usages (see the log at line no.1 in figure 6.2). This operation
comprises of the following API calls in a sequence:
1. initializeContext : initializing a context within Open-TEE;
2. openSession: opening a session to the OmniShare TA;
3. registerSharedMemory : registering a shared memory with a I/O direc-
tion as output for the TA. The shared memory will be used as a buffer
for the generated root key;
4. invokeCommand : asking the OmniShare TA to invoke a command with
specific command id and parameters (generating root key in here);
5. releaseSharedMemory : releasing the shared memory which previously
registered;
6. closeSession: closing the session to the OmniShare TA;
7. finalizeContext : finalizing the connect to Open-TEE.
After a root key is generated, the Initialize button will be enabled.
Initialize button just pass the previously generated root key to the Om-
niShare TA, which is needed in later operations (see the log at line no.2 in
figure 6.2). Since we have already released the shared memory used to hold
the root key in previous operation (the share memory also is output for the
TA), so we need to pass the root key to the TA specifically. This initializing
operation is a serial of the following API calls:
1. initializeContext : initializing a new context within Open-TEE;
2. registerSharedMemory : registering a shared memory with a I/O direc-
tion as input for the TA. The shared memory will be used as an input
buffer to pass the root key to the TA;
3. openSession: opening a session to the OmniShare TA with the public
authentication method;
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4. releaseSharedMemory : releasing the shared memory which was used to
pass the root key.
Since the session is not closed, the connection between the CA and the TA
is still valid. After the initialization operation done, the Finalize and Create
Directory Key buttons are enabled.
Finalize button closes the session previously opened and finalizes the con-
text initialized earlier (see the log at line no.6 in figure 6.2). It consists of
the following sequence of API calls:
1. closeSession: closing the session to the OmniShare TA;
2. finalizeContext : finalizing the connect to Open-TEE.
After this operation, the tester application will not longer be able to interact
with Open-TEE (so as the TA) without initializing a new context.
Create Directory Key button requests the TA to generate the directory
key for current directory using the root key given previously (see the log at
line no.3 in figure 6.2). This operation contains the following API calls:
1. registerSharedMemory : registering a shared memory with a I/O direc-
tion as output for the TA. The shared memory will be used as an
output buffer to pass the generated directory keys to the CA;
2. invokeCommand : asking the OmniShare TA to create directory keys;
3. releaseSharedMemory : releasing the shared memory which was used to
retrieve the directory keys.
Now, both the CA and TA have the generated directory keys.
Encrypt Data button requests the TA to encrypt a data buffer (shown in
the log noted as Initial data buffer in 6.2) using the directory keys (see the
log at line no.4 in figure 6.2). The following API calls are wrapped in this
operation:
1. registerSharedMemory : registering a shared memory with a I/O direc-
tion as input for the TA. The shared memory will be used as an input
buffer to pass the data, which is needed to be encrypted using directory
keys, to the TA;
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2. registerSharedMemory : registering a shared memory with a I/O direc-
tion as input for the TA. The shared memory will be used as an input
buffer to pass the previously generated directory keys to the TA;
3. registerSharedMemory : registering a shared memory with a I/O direc-
tion as output for the TA. The shared memory will be used as an
output buffer to pass out the encrypted data;
4. invokeCommand : asking the OmniShare TA encrypt the input data
using the directory keys;
5. releaseSharedMemory : releasing the shared memory which was used to
pass out the encrypted data.
6. releaseSharedMemory : releasing the shared memory which was used to
pass in the directory keys.
7. releaseSharedMemory : releasing the shared memory which was used to
pass in the unencrypted data.
This operation enables the Decrypt Data button.
Decrypt Data button requires the TA to decrypt the encrypted data
buffer using the directory keys. Its operation has a highly similar calling
sequence to the Encrypt Data operation (see the log at line no.5 in figure
6.2). So it is omitted in here. The outcome of this operation leads to the
same content as the Initial data buffer thus proving the correctness of our
implementations.
After all the buttons are clicked in a certain order, we can see the output
on the screen in figure 6.2.
As stated in section 4.5.2, the TEEC AllocateSharedMemory can be re-
placed by the TEEC RegisterSharedMemory thus its functionality fulfilled
by the registerSharedMemory Java API in our case. We still have the Re-
questCancellation to test. Normally, this API is used to cancel an operation
including either the openSession or invokeCommand which takes a consider-
able long time to proceed. However, it is very difficult to create a such sce-
nario to test this API. Without changing the source code of the OmniShare
TA, we cannot hang the TA for a certain among of time while waiting for
the requestCancellation to happen. But we have proved that the requestCan-
cellation is observed in the NativeLibtee. Other Java APIs are used in the
OmniShare tester application and proven to function very well.
In summary, our Java API does provide the same functionality as the GP
TEE Client API.
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6.2 R2: Java Convention
To design an API which is familiar to Java developers, we have focused on
making it easy to use, hiding unnecessary information and defining classes
as immutable as possible. The outcome is that all the C structs have been
transformed into Java classes (see in figure 6.3). C APIs are distributed into
these Java classes based on their scopes (see in chapter 4).
We also switched the return value based error handling method to the
exception based error handling mechanism which is more common in Java.
Last but not least, the Java factory method design pattern is normally used
to create an object without specifying what type of class of the object going
to be created. It is introduced into our Java API. For instance, the superclass
IParameter has a method called getType. Both IRegisteredMemoryReference
and IValue subclass the IParameter and implement the getType method. So
once the getType of one IParameter instance is called, it will return a value
based on the child of this IParameter instance.
6.3 R3: Ease-of-use
The first element of ease-of-use is that the Java developers no longer need
to write similar native code. They just simply import the OT-J into their
project and then start using the provided Java API. Moreover, we have two
OmniShare tester applications which have the same functionality to show
how much line of code can be reduced by using the OT-J. One (OmniShare
tester) is presented in previous section which is written in pure Java and
utilizes the OT-J. Another one (OmniShareJni tester) is a combination of
Java and native code which does not use the OT-J. For the codes which are
responsible for communicating with Open-TEE, omitting the major com-
ments, the OmniShareJni tester has proximately 661 lines of code while the
OmniShare tester only have around 368.
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Figure 6.1: OmniShare tester application initial state.
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Figure 6.2: Log messages printed on OmniShare tester application after all
buttons are pressed in a sequence.
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Figure 6.3: C structs to Java Classes
Chapter 7
Related Work
As far as we are aware, to date there is no open project which maps the GP
TEE Client API to the Java world. But several projects have devoted their
efforts to all the usage of secure hardware for applications written in native
code to Java. By focusing on their efforts of introducing functionality of these
secure hardware to Java developers, we can better evaluate our solution based
on the challenges and constraints they have been faced with.
7.1 Alternative to GP
There are many alternative TEEs available in current mobile devices but they
are not available for ordinary developers including us. So we only address
the TEE which is publicly accessable.
Trusty TEE & API On the Android platform, Google provides a bundle
of software components called Trusty which is a TEE [15]. It allows Android
processes to utilize the services provided by TAs running on top of the Trusty
OS whose implementation is hidden from developers. The Trusty provides
two sets of C APIs: one facilitates inter-communications between TAs and
another one defines how user-space processes (CAs) can talk to the TAs in
secure world. Similar to GP TEE APIs, they are also come with the form of
C style with limited C++ support. The TAs are single-threaded and do not
supply multithreading mechanisms.
JSR 177 JSR 177 [1] defines a collection of Java APIs to provide secure
services to J2ME [24] enabled devices. J2ME is a micro version of Java
platform, which targets for devices with limited computation and storage
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capabilities. So JSR177 enables Java applications running on top of J2ME
to integrate secure elements, such as secure execution and storage.
7.2 TPM from Java
Unlike the TEE which is more flexible, faster and widely deployed in the
mobile devices, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is either a piece of
hardware attached to the motherboard or a software implementation which
have specific usages, such as providing secure storage, a true random num-
ber generator and cryptographic operations [26, 32]. It mainly targets the
field of Personal Computers (PCs) (there is also an effort to adopt its usage
to Android [25]). The interfaces to access its functionality are defined in
the TCG Software Stack (TSS) specification [33] by the Trusted Comput-
ing Group(TCG). The TSS defines three vertical layers from top to bottom:
Trusted Service Provider (TSP) layer, Trusted Core Service (TCS) layer and
Trusted Device Driver Library (TDDL) layer. The functionality of TPM is
exposed to applications via the TSP Interface (TSPI).
One project called jTSS Wrapper wraps the C TSPI of the TrouSerS [31]
to Java interfaces [34]. TrouSerS is an open-source implementation of the
TSS by IBM. Resemblances between their work and ours are that there are
existing specifications which standardize the ways to use security hardware.
Resemblances are, too, that these specifications are in the form of C pro-
gramming language, which leads the efforts to map the C API to Java API
thus relieving the burdens of handling native code for Java developers. How-
ever they used the SWIG [4] as the glue for C and Java while we directly
deal with the Java Native Interface (JNI) which can allow java object ma-
nipulations from both directions. Later this project is included into another
one called jTSS which is a full implementation of TSS layers purely in Java
[5, 16]. Depending on how a GP-compliant TEE brings its functionality to
normal developers in the future, it is unlikely that ordinary applications can
directly use a kernel driver to communicate with the TEE just like TPM
does. In addition, OT-J is mainly targeting the Android environment which
does not allow direct access to the kernel drivers.
There are other projects which also try to make TPM available for Java
developers while not conforming to the TSS specification, such as TPM/J
[27].
TPM/J is intended to not comply with the TSS specification which are
used for experiments and R&D purposes by developers and researchers where
the TSS is not that important [27]. The data objects, such as commands
and responses, transferred as byte streams via TPM driver are mapped to
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corresponding Java objects in TMP/J as such easy the access to the field
members of these data objects.
Based on previous efforts introduced above, the Java community proposed
its own Java API which provides the identical functionality as the TSS spec-
ification. The API proposal is named as JSR321 [30]. Compared with the
TSS, JSR321 also conform to the concepts introduced by the TCG. But it
hides the underlying interactions with TPM driver and only expose the API
with Java conventions to developers.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
Normally the functionality of the TEE is hidden from ordinary developers.
Thanks to the efforts of GlobalPlatform by publishing TEE related specifi-
cations, it makes a source-level compatibility between TEEs from different
vendors. Similar to the usages of other secure hardware, the specifications
define C API which can be problematic for Java developers. There are efforts
trying to make the functionality of secure hardware available to Java devel-
opers as stated in chapter 7. Such efforts include providing a Java wrapper
library on top of the C API or re-implementing the C API in Java. The
approach we have taken is providing a Java wrapper library named as OT-J
on top of the GP TEE Client API. To validate the functionality and usability
of the OT-J, a prototype implementation has been done on top of Android
architecture. We also evaluate the outcome of the OT-J to prove that our
evaluation shows that OT-J satisfies the requirements initially defined in
chapter 3.
In terms of future works, extra efforts should be put on integrating the
features of OmniShare TA to OmniShare application.
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Java API Version: V 1.0 beta
 
This is the main entrance of public APIs. In order to help explaining the APIs, there are several essential key words defined in the
following:
 1. CA: Client Application that the developer is creating;
 2. TA: Trusted Application which is already deployed in TEE;
 3. TEE: Trusted Execution Environment in target Android device within which TAs are running;
 4. TEE (Proxy) Service Manager: Android service layer abstraction for TEE, which is responsible for handling incoming
connections from CAs and for communicating with the TEE with the help of Native Libtee;
 5. Native Libtee: A library which enables the communication between TEE and TEE Service Manager;
 6. Underlying library: A library which resides in the CA and communicates with the remote TEE service on the behalf of CAs.
 
Introduction
This public API documentation defines the Java APIs corresponding to the C APIs defined in the GlobalPlatform Device




This document suits for software developers implementing:
 1. Android version of CAs running within the rich operating environment, which needs to utilizing the functions of TAs;
 2. TAs running inside the TEE which need to expose its internal functions to CAs.
 
Background information
 1. what is TEE?
 TEE stands for Trusted Execution Environment. There is another notation called Rich Execution Environment (REE). These two
are often brought together to help explain both of them by comparisons. Before taking a look at TEE, it is better to start explaining
from REE since it is more closer to our daily sense. REE represents the common operating system along with its hardware, such as
devices running Windows, Mac OSX, Linux, Android or iOS. It abstracts the underlying hardware and provides resources for the
applications to run with. As such, it has rich features for applications to utilize. However, the REE frequently suffer from different
kinds of attacks, such as malware, worm, trojan and ransomware. In order to protect very sensitive and private information such as
encryption private keys against these attacks, it is good to keep these private information safely in a separate container in case the
REE is compromised. It is the similar notion as the safe deposit box. For instance, if bad guys broke into a home, it is still
impossible for them to get all your money in the safe deposit box without the right password to open it. So, with such a thought,
TEE showed up to meet such needs. Currently, the TEE shipped within devices is physically separated with REE by hardware
boundaries. CAs run in the REE and TAs runs in the TEE. Compared with the rich features of REE, TEE mostly comes with very
limited hardware capabilities.
 
2. GP Specification for TEE Client API Specification.
 GP is short for GlobalPlatform. It is a non-profit organization that publishes specifications to promote security and interoperability
of secure devices. One of the specifications it published, named "GlobalPlatform Device Technology TEE Client API
Specification" (GP Client API), standardizes the ways how CAs communicate with TAs. GlobalPlatform also have other
specifications for TEE but we only focus on this one specifically. The specification defines the C data types and functions for CAs
to communicate with TAs.
 
3. Open-TEE
 Open-TEE is an open virtual Trusted Execution Environment which conforms to the GP TEE Specifications. For devices which
are not equipped with real hardware-based TEE, it can provide a virtual TEE for developers to debug and deploy TAs before
shipping applications to a real TEE.
 
API Design
 1. What are these Java APIs and what their relationships with GP TEE Client Specification?
 In general, these APIs are the Java version of C APIs in GP Client API specification with a reformed design to fit Java
development conventions, which mainly target on the Android devices. It can be used to develop Android CAs which want to
utilize the functionality which TAs offer. It provides all the necessary functions for CAs to communicate with remote TAs just like
the C APIs defined in GP Specification.
 
2. Why they are needed?
(continued on next page)
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 In GP TEE Client Specification, it only specify the C data types and APIs which limit or complicate the development of CAs
which aim for Android devices. Since Java is the mainstream programming language to develop Android applications, for Android
developers who wants to utilize the GP C API to enable the communications between CAs and TAs, it would be troublesome to
deal with native code development, especially for those who are not familiar with it, which can result in more potential bugs and
unexpected behaviours if not handled correctly. Under such circumstances, every developers have to re-write these codes with the
similar functionality, which can be a waste of efforts and error-prone. To avoid such awkward situations, an open-sourced design,
which can enable the CAs communicate with TAs while provide nice and clean public interfaces for Android developers, is urgent
to conquer this issue. With such a thought, the coming public Java APIs are available for Android developers, which can release
them from the burdens of dealing native development in Android. It might be not that efficient as directly dealing with C APIs but
the performance should be in a tolerant level. In addition, all the implementations of public APIS are open-source for everyone. By
taking feedback from developers, these shared codes can be more bug-free and efficient.
 
3. How to use it and what to expect from the APIs?
 a. Prerequisites
 - The TA is already deployed in Open-TEE.
 - The Android application which provides a remote TEE Proxy service should be running.
 b. Check the descriptions for each API.
 
Bug report to:
 rui.yang at aalto.fi
 
Organization:
 Security System Group, Aalto University School of Science, Espoo, Finland.
 
Appendix: Example code chapter
The following example codes demonstrate how to utilize the Java API to communicate with the TAs residing in the TEE.
 
Firstly, we assume that we get an ITEEClient interface by calling a factory method. The way to obtain an ITEEClient interface
depends on real implementation. The following code is just an example.
 
 
Right now, we want to establish a connection to a remote TEE Proxy service so that we can interact with the TAs running inside of
TEE. By using the ITEEClient interface we obtained from last step, we can establish a connection to a remote TEE by calling
initializeContext method in ITEEClient interface. For the two input parameters, please refer to the API definition in
ITEEClient.IContext interface. If no exception is caught, a valid IContext interface will be returned and program flow
continues to next block of code. Otherwise, the returned IContext interface will be null and an exception will be threw. For
different kinds of exceptions can be threw by this API, please also refer to this API definition in ITEEClient.IContext
interface. In the handling exception code block, it is recommended to re-initializeContext again and the program flow should not
continue until it get a valid IContext interface. 
 
 
After we successfully connected to the remote TEE Proxy service, in order to interact with one TA, we must open a session to the
TA by providing correct authentication data. To open a session, the function openSession within IContext interface must be
called. For the input parameters for the API and possible exceptions threw by it, please refer to the API definition in
ITEEClient.IContext interface. For the creation of param_operation parameter, please refer to the example code which creates
(continued from last page)
  ITEEClient client = FactoryMethodWrappers.newTEEClient();
  ITEEClient.IContext ctx = null;
  final String param_TEE_NAME = null; // connect to the default TEE.
  final android.context.Context param_app_context = getApplicationContext();
  try {
      ctx = client.initializeContext(param_TEE_NAME,
                                     param_app_context);
  } catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }
(continued on next page)
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an IOperation interface using the factory method newOperation in the coming sections. 
 
 
After successfully opened a session to a specific TA, a valid ITEEClient.ISession interface will be returned. So we can
interact with TA by using invokeCommand API within the ITEEClient.ISession interface. The creation of param_operation
please also refer to the same example code which creates an IOperation interface. 
 
 
In some cases, data is needed to be transferred between CAs and TAs. So the API provides two different kinds of data
encapsulation mechanisms. After that, they can be encapsulated again within ITEEClient.IOperation which can be sent to TA
during openSession or invokeCommand calls. 
 
The first approach is to create an ITEEClient.IValue interface by calling newValue factory method in ITEEClient. So up to 2
integer values can be encapsulated. The two values are given when calling newValue function and further interactions with this
pair of values are defined in the ITEEClient.IValue interface.
 
 
Another approach to transfer the data is using shared memory. The notation shared memory in here works as follows. Firstly, CA
create a byte array as the buffer for the shared memory. Then, the CA registers the byte array as a shared memory to the TA so that
(continued from last page)
  ITEEClient.ISession ses = null;
  final UUID param_uuid = new UUID(0x1234567887654321L, 0x0102030405060708L);
  final ConnectionMethod param_conn_method =
          ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod.LoginPublic;
  final Integer param_conn_data = null;
  try {
      ses = ctx.openSession(param_uuid,
                  param_conn_method,
                  param_conn_data,
                  param_operation);
  } catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }
  final int param_comm_id = 0x12345678;
  try{
      ses.invokeCommand(param_comm_id,
                        param_operation);
  }catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }
  final ITEEClient.IValue.Flag param_flag = ITEEClient.IValue.Flag.TEEC_VALUE_INOUT;
  int param_value_A = 66;
  int param_value_B = 88;
  ITEEClient.IValue val = client.newValue(param_flag,
                                          param_value_A,
                                          param_value_B);
(continued on next page)
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TA can also operate on the buffer. To create a shared memory, the CA must call registerSharedMemory method in
ITEEClient.IContext. An ITEEClient.ISharedMemory interface will be returned. 
 
 
After encapsulating the data within IValue interface or ISharedMemory interface, in order to share the data with TA, we must
encapsulate these interfaces again into an ITEEClient.IOperation interface which then can be passed to TA during
openSession or invokeCommand calls. The IValue interface can be directly used. However, to use the shared memory, the
ISharedMemory interface must be encapsulated again into an ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference interface. Then
along with the IValue interface, it can be used to create an ITEEClient.IOperation interface. To create an




To create an IOperation interface, the factory method newOperation within ITEEClient must be called. The input parameters
can be up to 4 IValue or IRegisteredMemoryReference interfaces. 
 
 
Resource cleaning up 
 
If shared memory is no longer needed, it must be released by calling releaseSharedMemory function within IContext
interface.
 
(continued from last page)
  ITEEClient.ISharedMemory sm = null;
  byte[] param_byte_array = new byte[256];
  ITEEClient.ISharedMemory param_flags =
          ITEEClient.ISharedMemory.TEEC_MEM_INPUT |
          ITEEClient.ISharedMemory.TEEC_MEM_OUTPUT;
  try{
      sm = ctx.registerSharedMemory(param_byte_array,
                                    param_flags);
  } catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }
  ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag param_flags =
          ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag.TEEC_MEMREF_INOUT;
  final param_offset = 0;
  ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference rmr =
          client.newRegisteredMemoryReference(sm,
                                              param_flags,
                                              param_offset);
  ITEEClient.IOperation op = client.newOperation(rmr, val);
(continued on next page)
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 The session also must be closed if CA no longer wants to interact with the TA. 
 
 
Once CA no longer need to communicate with TEE, the context must be finalized. Be aware to release all the resources, mainly
shared memory, and close all sessions before finalizing context. 
 
 
(continued from last page)
  try {
      ctx.releaseSharedMemory(sm);
  } catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }
  try {
      ses.closeSession();
  } catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }
  try {
      ctx.finalizeContext();
  } catch (TEEClientException e) {
      // handle TEEClientException here.
  }







Open-TEE Java API entry point. ITEEClient interface embraces all APIs and public interfaces. CA can use it to communicate
























public static final TEEC_SUCCESS





initializeContext(java.lang.String teeName, Context context)








a method to create an operation with one parameter.




















secondParam, ITEEClient.IParameter thirdParam, ITEEClient.IParameter
forthParam)





ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag flag, int offset)




newValue(ITEEClient.IValue.Flag flag, int a, int b)
A method to create an interface of a pair of two integer values.
Fields
TEEC_SUCCESS
public static final int TEEC_SUCCESS




public abstract ITEEClient.IOperation newOperation()
a method to create an operation without parameter.
Returns:
an IOperation interface for created operation.
newOperation
public abstract ITEEClient.IOperation newOperation(ITEEClient.IParameter firstParam)
a method to create an operation with one parameter. It is possible to create multiple IOperation interfaces using the same
IParameter. But it is not recommended especially when the I/O direction of IParameter is output for TA since it is
possible that such an IParameter is in an inconsistent state. This rule also apply to other newOperation overloaded
functions which take IParameter(s) as inputs.
Parameters:
firstParam - the first IParameter.
Returns:
an IOperation interface for created operation.
(continued on next page)




(continued from last page)
newOperation
public abstract ITEEClient.IOperation newOperation(ITEEClient.IParameter firstParam,
         ITEEClient.IParameter secondParam)
a method to create an operation with two parameters. The order of input parameters should be aligned with the order of
required parameters in TA. This rule also apply to other overloaded newOperation functions which takes more than two
parameters.
Parameters:
firstParam - the first IParameter.
secondParam - the second IParameter.
Returns:
an IOperation interface for created operation.
newOperation
public abstract ITEEClient.IOperation newOperation(ITEEClient.IParameter firstParam,
         ITEEClient.IParameter secondParam,
         ITEEClient.IParameter thirdParam)
a method to create an operation with three parameters.
Parameters:
firstParam - the first IParameter.
secondParam - the second IParameter.
thirdParam - the third IParameter.
Returns:
an IOperation interface for created operation.
newOperation
public abstract ITEEClient.IOperation newOperation(ITEEClient.IParameter firstParam,
         ITEEClient.IParameter secondParam,
         ITEEClient.IParameter thirdParam,
         ITEEClient.IParameter forthParam)
a method to create an operation with four parameters.
Parameters:
firstParam - the first IParameter.
secondParam - the second IParameter.
thirdParam - the third IParameter.
forthParam - the forth IParameter.
Returns:




         ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag flag,
         int offset)
  throws BadParametersException
A method to create a IRegisteredMemoryReference interface with a valid ISharedMemory interface. The flag
parameter is only taken into considerations when the I/O direction(s) it implies are a subset of I/O directions of the
referenced shared memory. It will not override the flags which the shared memory already have.
(continued on next page)
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Parameters:
sharedMemory - the shared memory to refer.
flag - the flag for referenced shared memory.
offset - the offset from the beginning of the buffer of shared memory.
newValue
public abstract ITEEClient.IValue newValue(ITEEClient.IValue.Flag flag,
         int a,
         int b)
A method to create an interface of a pair of two integer values.
Parameters:
flag - The I/O directory of IValue for TAs.
a - The first integer value.




public abstract ITEEClient.IContext initializeContext(java.lang.String teeName,
         Context context)
  throws TEEClientException
A method which initializes a context to a TEE.
Parameters:
teeName - the name of remote TEE. If teeName is null, a context will be initialized within a default TEE.




exception.AccessDeniedException: - Unable to initialize a context with the remote TEE due to insufficient
privileges of the CA.
exception.BadStateException: - TEE is not ready to initialize a context for the CA.
exception.BadParametersException: - providing an invalid Android context.
exception.BusyException: - TEE is busy.
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with remote TEE service failed.
exception.GenericErrorException: - Non-specific cause exception.
exception.TargetDeadException: - TEE crashed.








This interface defines the way to interact with an Operation which is a wrapper class for 0 to 4 IParameter(s). It can be created
only by calling the function newOperation. After a valid IOperation interface is returned, developers can refer to the
corresponding Operation in either openSession or invokeCommand function calls. When dealing with multiple threads, one
IOperation interface can be shared between different threads. So it is possible that multiple threads try to access the same
IOperation interface at the same time. If one or more IParameter interfaces wrapped inside the IOperation is output for the
TA, it is possible that the IParameter(s) might be in an inconsistent state which may result in an incorrect read of the
corresponding wrapped resources within IParameter(s), such as IValue and SharedMemory. Furthermore, if one thread
attempts to apply one IOperation interface in its openSession or InvokeCommand function call while this IOperation
interface is being used by another thread, a BusyException will be thrown. In addition, if one IOperation interface is modified
by another thread, it is the responsibilities of developers to be aware of the changes. In order to avoid misuse of the IOperation
interface, developers should not access any wrapped resources in an IOperation interface which is in use. The state of the
IOperation can be obtained by calling its isStarted function. So it is recommended that developers should check the state of








If one IOperation interface is being used in an ongoing operation (either openSession or
invokeCommand) in a separate thread, this function will return true.
Methods
isStarted
public abstract boolean isStarted()
If one IOperation interface is being used in an ongoing operation (either openSession or invokeCommand) in a separate
thread, this function will return true. Developers can utilize this function to test the availability of the IOperation
interface.
Returns:
true if IOperation is under usage. Otherwise false if not being used.








IParameter interface is the super class of IRegisteredMemoryReference and IValue interfaces, It can passed into the
newOperation to create an IOperation interface. It is possible to share the IParameter interface between different threads.


















Get the type of the IParameter interface.
Methods
getType
public abstract ITEEClient.IParameter.Type getType()
Get the type of the IParameter interface.
Returns:
an enum value Type which can be either TEEC_PTYPE_VAL or TEEC_PTYPE_RMR.





   |
   +-java.lang.Enum
      |
      +-fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IParameter.Type
 
public static final class ITEEClient.IParameter.Type
extends java.lang.Enum
 













public static final TEEC_PTYPE_RMR
This Parameter is a RegisteredMemoryReference.
public static final TEEC_PTYPE_VAL










Methods inherited from class java.lang.Enum
clone, compareTo, equals, finalize, getDeclaringClass, hashCode, name, ordinal,
toString, valueOf
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait,
wait
Methods inherited from interface java.lang.Comparable
compareTo
Fields
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TEEC_PTYPE_VAL
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IParameter.Type TEEC_PTYPE_VAL
This Parameter is a Value.
TEEC_PTYPE_RMR
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IParameter.Type TEEC_PTYPE_RMR
This Parameter is a RegisteredMemoryReference.
Methods
values
public static ITEEClient.IParameter.Type[] values()
valueOf
public static ITEEClient.IParameter.Type valueOf(java.lang.String name)








Interface for registered memory reference. When a shared memory needs to be passed to a remote TEE/TA, it must be wrapped
within the IRegisteredMemoryReference. It can be only obtained by calling the newRegisteredMemoryReference
function. It is possible that multiple IRegisteredMemoryReference interfaces are referencing the same ISharedMemory
















Get the offset set previously.
abstract int getReturnSize()





Get the referenced registered shared memory.




public abstract ITEEClient.ISharedMemory getSharedMemory()
Get the referenced registered shared memory.
Returns:
ISharedMemory interface for the referenced shared memory.
getOffset
public abstract int getOffset()
Get the offset set previously.
Returns:
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an integer with a value ranging from 0 to the size of referenced shared memory.
getReturnSize
public abstract int getReturnSize()
Get the size of returned buffer from TEE/TA. This function will return a valid value ( >= 0) only when the following two
requirements are met at the same time:
either TEEC_MEMREF_OUTPUT or TEEC_MEMREF_INOUT is marked as the flag of referenced shared memory;•
the referenced shared memory also can be used as output for TAs.•
Otherwise, 0 will be returned. This function is normally called after the TA or TEE writes some data back to the referenced
shared memory so that CA can know how big is the size of the returned data.
Returns:
an integer value as the returned size.





   |
   +-java.lang.Enum
      |
      +-fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag
 
public static final class ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag
extends java.lang.Enum
 













public static final TEEC_MEMREF_INOUT
The I/O directions of the referenced registered shared memory are both input and output for
TAs.
public static final TEEC_MEMREF_INPUT
The I/O direction of the referenced registered shared memory is input for TAs.
public static final TEEC_MEMREF_OUTPUT











Methods inherited from class java.lang.Enum
clone, compareTo, equals, finalize, getDeclaringClass, hashCode, name, ordinal,
toString, valueOf
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait,
wait
Methods inherited from interface java.lang.Comparable
compareTo
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Fields
TEEC_MEMREF_INPUT
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag
TEEC_MEMREF_INPUT
The I/O direction of the referenced registered shared memory is input for TAs.
TEEC_MEMREF_OUTPUT
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag
TEEC_MEMREF_OUTPUT
The I/O direction of the referenced registered shared memory is output for TAs.
TEEC_MEMREF_INOUT
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag
TEEC_MEMREF_INOUT
The I/O directions of the referenced registered shared memory are both input and output for TAs.
Methods
values
public static ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag[] values()
valueOf
public static ITEEClient.IRegisteredMemoryReference.Flag valueOf(java.lang.String
name)
























Get the first value.
abstract int getB()
Get the second value.




public abstract int getA()




public abstract int getB()
Get the second value.
Returns:
an integer.





   |
   +-java.lang.Enum
      |
      +-fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IValue.Flag
 
public static final class ITEEClient.IValue.Flag
extends java.lang.Enum
 













public static final TEEC_VALUE_INOUT
The I/O directions for Value are both input and output for TAs.
public static final TEEC_VALUE_INPUT
The I/O direction for Value is input for TAs.
public static final TEEC_VALUE_OUTPUT










Methods inherited from class java.lang.Enum
clone, compareTo, equals, finalize, getDeclaringClass, hashCode, name, ordinal,
toString, valueOf
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait,
wait
Methods inherited from interface java.lang.Comparable
compareTo
Fields
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TEEC_VALUE_INPUT
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IValue.Flag TEEC_VALUE_INPUT
The I/O direction for Value is input for TAs.
TEEC_VALUE_OUTPUT
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IValue.Flag TEEC_VALUE_OUTPUT
The I/O direction for Value is output for TAs.
TEEC_VALUE_INOUT
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IValue.Flag TEEC_VALUE_INOUT
The I/O directions for Value are both input and output for TAs.
Methods
values
public static ITEEClient.IValue.Flag[] values()
valueOf
public static ITEEClient.IValue.Flag valueOf(java.lang.String name)








For a CA to communicate with a TA within a TEE, a session must be opened between the CA and TA. To open a session, the CA
must call openSession within a valid context. When a session is opened, an ISession interface will be returned. It contains all
functions for the CA to communicate with the TA. Within this session, developers can call the invokeCommand function to invoke









Close the connection to the remote TA.
abstract void invokeCommand(int commandId, ITEEClient.IOperation operation)
Sending a request to the connected TA with agreed commandId and parameters.
Methods
invokeCommand
public abstract void invokeCommand(int commandId,
         ITEEClient.IOperation operation)
  throws TEEClientException
Sending a request to the connected TA with agreed commandId and parameters. The parameters are encapsulated in the
operation.
Parameters:
commandId - command identifier that is previously agreed with the TA. Based on the command id, CA can tell TA to
perform a certain action. TA will know what to perform.
operation - a wrapper of parameters for the action to take.
Throws:
exception.AccessConflictException: - using shared resources which are occupied by another thread;
exception.BadFormatException: - providing incorrect format of parameters in operation;
exception.BadParametersException: - providing parameters with invalid content;
exception.BusyException: - 1. the TEE is busy working on something else and does not have the computation
power to execute requested operation;
 2. the referenced IOperation interface is being used by another thread.
exception.CancelErrorException: - the provided operation is invalid due to the cancellation from another
thread;
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - 1. fatal communication error occurred in the remote TEE and TA
side;
 2. Communication with the TEE proxy service failed.
exception.ExcessDataException: - providing too much parameters in the operation.
exception.ExternalCancelException: - current operation cancelled by external signal in the CA, remote TEE
or TA side.
exception.GenericErrorException: - non-specific error.
exception.ItemNotFoundException: - providing invalid reference to a registered shared memory.
exception.NoDataException: - required data are missing in the operation.
exception.NotImplementedException: - action mapped with this command id is not implemented in TA yet.
exception.NotSupportedException: - action mapped with this command id is not supported in TA.
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exception.OutOfMemoryException: - the remote system runs out of memory.
exception.OverflowException: - an buffer overflow happened in the remote TEE or TA.
exception.SecurityErrorException: - incorrect usage of shared memory.
exception.ShortBufferException: - the provided output buffer is too short to hold the output.
exception.TargetDeadException: - the remote TEE or TA crashed.
closeSession
public abstract void closeSession()
  throws TEEClientException
Close the connection to the remote TA. When dealing with multi-threads, this function is recommended to be called with
the same thread which opens this session.
Throws:
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with remote TEE service failed.
exception.TargetDeadException: - the remote TEE or TA crashed.








In order to enable data sharing between a CA and TEE/TA, the notation called shared memory has been introduced to avoid
expensive memory copies. A shared memory is a block of memory resides in the CA and a TEE/TA can operate on it directly. But
how effective the shared memory is depends on the real implementation on specific systems. To create a shared memory, the CA
firstly allocate a buffer which can be used as a shared memory. Then, the CA calls the registerSharedMemory to register the
buffer as a shared memory to the remote TEE so that the TA can also operate on it. When the CA tries to register a shared memory,
the I/O direction of this shared memory must be provided along with the buffer of the shared memory. The I/O direction is a bit
mask of TEEC_MEM_INPUT and TEEC_MEM_OUTPUT. Note that the I/O direction of this shared memory is for the remote
TEE/TA. See the detailed explanation of these two flags in the field description. The size of the shared memory is the same as the
buffer that it holds. When the CA successfully register this buffer as a shared memory with a flag of TEEC_MEM_INPUT, any
modification on this buffer will be synced to the TEE/TA during each function call from the CA to the TEE. Similarly, if the
shared memory is flagged with TEEC_MEM_OUTPUT, any modification of the shared memory from the TEE side will be synced
back to the CA after each remote function call from the CA to the TEE. 
 
ISharedMemory interface provides operations on the shared memory. It is only valid in a IContext interface. This interface can
be only obtained by calling registerSharedMemory function. If the registered shared memory is not longer needed, developers
should release it by calling releaseSharedMemory function. After the shared memory is released, the buffer it holds will not









public static final TEEC_MEM_INPUT
This value indicates the I/O direction of the shared memory is input for both TEE and TA.
Value: 1
public static final TEEC_MEM_OUTPUT




Get the content of the shared memory.
abstract int getFlags()
Get the I/O direction of the shared memory.
Fields
TEEC_MEM_INPUT
public static final int TEEC_MEM_INPUT
This value indicates the I/O direction of the shared memory is input for both TEE and TA.
Constant value: 1
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TEEC_MEM_OUTPUT
public static final int TEEC_MEM_OUTPUT




public abstract int getFlags()
Get the I/O direction of the shared memory.
Returns:
the flags of ISharedMemory.
asByteArray
public abstract byte[] asByteArray()
Get the content of the shared memory. This function returns a reference to the buffer that the shared memory holds.
Returns:
an byte array reference.





   |
   +-java.lang.Enum
      |
      +-fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode
 
public static final class ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode
extends java.lang.Enum
 
A enum indicates the origin when an exception is threw. It can be obtained by calling getReturnOrigin of a caught exception.
Developers can get a valid return origin only when the exceptions are threw by these two functions: openSession and










public static final TEEC_ORIGIN_API
The exception is originated within the TEE Client API implementation.
public static final TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS
The exception is originated within the underlying communications stack linking: 1.
public static final TEEC_ORIGIN_TA
The exception is originated within the TA.
public static final TEEC_ORIGIN_TEE










Methods inherited from class java.lang.Enum
clone, compareTo, equals, finalize, getDeclaringClass, hashCode, name, ordinal,
toString, valueOf
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait,
wait
Methods inherited from interface java.lang.Comparable
compareTo











public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode TEEC_ORIGIN_API
The exception is originated within the TEE Client API implementation.
TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS
The exception is originated within the underlying communications stack linking:
 1. the CA with remote TEE Proxy service;
 2. the TEE Proxy service with the TEE.
TEEC_ORIGIN_TEE
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode TEEC_ORIGIN_TEE
The exception is originated within the common TEE code.
TEEC_ORIGIN_TA
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode TEEC_ORIGIN_TA
The exception is originated within the TA.
Methods
values
public static ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode[] values()
valueOf
public static ITEEClient.ReturnOriginCode valueOf(java.lang.String name)








IContext interface provides all the functions to interact with an initialized context in remote TEE. This interface is returned by
the initializeContext function call. When a context is no longer needed, it should be closed by calling finalizeContext.
When the IContext interface is passed into different threads, developers are responsible for providing thread-safe mechanism to













Finalizing the context and close the connection to the TEE after all sessions have been










registerSharedMemory(byte[] buffer, int flags)
Register a block of existing CA memory as a shared memory within.
abstract void releaseSharedMemory(ITEEClient.ISharedMemory sharedMemory)
Releases the Shared Memory which was previously obtained using
registerSharedMemory.
abstract void requestCancellation(ITEEClient.IOperation operation)
Requests the cancellation of a pending open session or a command invocation operation.
Methods
finalizeContext
public abstract void finalizeContext()
  throws TEEClientException
Finalizing the context and close the connection to the TEE after all sessions have been terminated and all shared memories
have been released. This function is recommended to be called at the end of the thread which initialized the context.
Throws:
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with remote TEE service failed.
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registerSharedMemory
public abstract ITEEClient.ISharedMemory registerSharedMemory(byte[] buffer,
         int flags)
  throws TEEClientException
Register a block of existing CA memory as a shared memory within. When this function tries to register a buffer as a
shared memory which is already used by another shared memory, this function will also return a valid ISharedMemory
interface. The TEE will regard this buffer as two identical shared memory. This will cause problems such as an
MacInvalidException. However, when a shared memory is released, the buffer it holds can be registered again as a new
shared memory. For the CA, the new shared memory has the same buffer but it is identical for the TEE.
Parameters:
buffer - pre-allocated byte array which is to be shared.
flags - indicates I/O direction of this shared memory for TAs.
Throws:
exception.BadParametersException: - 1. try to register a null/empty buffer as a shared memory;
 2. providing incorrect flag value.
exception.BadStateException: - TEE is not ready to register a shared memory.
exception.BusyException: - TEE is busy.
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with remote TEE service failed.
exception.ExternalCancelException: - Current operation is cancelled by external signal in TEE.
exception.GenericErrorException: - Non-specific causes error.
exception.NoStorageSpaceException: - Insufficient storage in TEE.
exception.OutOfMemoryException: - Insufficient memory in TEE.
exception.OverflowException: - Buffer overflow in TEE.
exception.TargetDeadException: - TEE/TA crashed.
releaseSharedMemory
public abstract void releaseSharedMemory(ITEEClient.ISharedMemory sharedMemory)
  throws TEEClientException
Releases the Shared Memory which was previously obtained using registerSharedMemory. As stated in the description
of the ISharedMemory interface, when the shared memory is released, the TEE/TA will no longer be able to read or write
data to the shared memory. However, the buffer that this shared memory holds will still remain valid. When using the same
shared memory within multi-threads, it is recommended to release the shared memory in the same thread which registered
it.
Parameters:
sharedMemory - the reference to an ISharedMemory instance.
Throws:
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with the remote TEE service failed.
exception.BadParametersException: - Incorrect ISharedMemory instance such as passing a null object.
openSession
public abstract ITEEClient.ISession openSession(java.util.UUID uuid,
         ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod connectionMethod,
         java.lang.Integer connectionData,
         ITEEClient.IOperation operation)
  throws TEEClientException
Open a session with a TA within the current context. A session is a channel through which a CA can communicate with a
specific TA (specified by the uuid). In order to open such a channel successfully, the CA must provide precise and correct
data to authenticate itself to the TA.
Parameters:
uuid - UUID of the TA.
connectionMethod - the method of connection to use.
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connectionData - any necessary data for connectionMethod.




exception.AccessDeniedException: - Insufficient privilege.
exception.BadFormatException: - Using incorrect format of parameter(s).
exception.BadParametersException: - Unexpected value(s) for parameter(s).
exception.BadStateException: - TEE is not ready to open a session or the referenced IOperation interface is
occupied by another thread.
exception.BusyException: - TEE is busy.
exception.CancelErrorException: - Current operation is cancelled by another thread.
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with remote TEE service failed.
exception.ExternalCancelException: - Cancelled by external interrupt.
exception.GenericErrorException: - Non-specific cause.
exception.ItemNotFoundException: - Referred shared memory not found.
exception.NoDataException: - Extra data expected.
exception.NoStorageSpaceException: - Insufficient data storage in TEE.
exception.OutOfMemoryException: - TEE runs out of memory.
exception.OverflowException: - Buffer overflow in TEE.
exception.SecurityErrorException: - Incorrect usage of shared memory.
exception.ShortBufferException: - the provided output buffer is too short to hold the output.
exception.TargetDeadException: - TEE/TA crashed.
requestCancellation
public abstract void requestCancellation(ITEEClient.IOperation operation)
  throws TEEClientException
Requests the cancellation of a pending open session or a command invocation operation. This can be called from a
different thread from that which is waiting for the IOperation interface. It is not guaranteed that the operation can be
cancelled.
Parameters:
operation - the started or pending operation instance.
Throws:
exception.CommunicationErrorException: - Communication with remote TEE service failed.
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public static final class ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
extends java.lang.Enum
 









public static final LoginApplication
Login data about the running CA process itself is provided.
public static final LoginGroup
Login data about the group running the CA process is provided.
public static final LoginGroupApplication
Login data about the group running the CA and about the Client Application and the about
the CA itself is provided.
public static final LoginPublic
No login data is provided.
public static final LoginUser
Login data about the user running the CA process is provided.
public static final LoginUserApplication











Methods inherited from class java.lang.Enum
clone, compareTo, equals, finalize, getDeclaringClass, hashCode, name, ordinal,
toString, valueOf
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object











clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, toString, wait, wait,
wait




public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
LoginPublic
No login data is provided.
LoginUser
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
LoginUser
Login data about the user running the CA process is provided.
LoginGroup
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
LoginGroup
Login data about the group running the CA process is provided.
LoginApplication
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
LoginApplication
Login data about the running CA process itself is provided.
LoginUserApplication
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
LoginUserApplication
Login data about the user running the CA and about the Client Application itself is provided.
LoginGroupApplication
public static final fi.aalto.ssg.opentee.ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod
LoginGroupApplication
Login data about the group running the CA and about the Client Application and the about the CA itself is provided.
Methods
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values
public static ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod[] values()
valueOf
public static ITEEClient.IContext.ConnectionMethod valueOf(java.lang.String name)





   |


















Factory method to create a new TEEClient interface.
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object







public static ITEEClient newTEEClient()
Factory method to create a new TEEClient interface.
Returns:
an ITEEClient interface.
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Figure A.1: Aalto logo variants
